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Plaintiff and Appellant Reliance Insurance Company (Reliance)
submits this Reply Brief in response to Defendant and Appellee Utah
Department of Transportation's (UDOT) Brief of Appellee. The
majority of UDOT's arguments raised in its brief are addressed in
Reliance's original brief. However, Reliance will here amplify
certain points and draw the Court's attention to several
inaccuracies in the law and facts contained in UDOT's brief in
order to clarify the issues and the proper resolution of these
issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Some of the allegations in UDOT's Statement of Facts in and
other parts of its brief are not properly supported by the record
and should not be relied upon. Others are irrelevant and merely
obscure the issues. In offering 18 paragraphs of purported facts,
UDOT does not once refer to the Findings of Fact. UDOT's
allegation of facts contrary to or outside of the Findings of Fact,
without making any specific challenge to the Findings of Fact and
without marshalling all of the relevant evidence, is improper.1
Chief among these allegations is UDOT's assertion in paragraph
16 that "UDOT incurred expenses during December 1985 and from
January 1, 198 6 through June 1986 totalling $82,631.16." UDOT's
repeated reference to $8 2,631.16 as the amount of its actual
damages is contrary to the evidence, including stipulated facts,
the Court's Bench Decision, and the Court's Findings of Fact.
'Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987) .
2
Before trial UDOT and Reliance stipulated to certain
undisputed facts, which are set out in a Statement of Stipulated
Facts.2 That statement was like a guidebook for the trial, setting
forth certain benchmark dates and events. Item 13 of the Statement
of Stipulated Facts established that an agreement between UDOT and
Young, S. A. 12, "effectively extended the date for completion to
January 8, 1986." (Emphasis added.) Item 1.4 of the Statement
provides, "UDOT ceased assessment of liquidated damages on June 13,
1986." Item 17 provides,
UDOT assessed liquidated damages of $94,800.00
based on $6 00.00 per day for a total of 158
days. The proper number of days between
January 8, 198 6, and June 13, 1986, is 156
days so that Reliance is entitled to
$1,200.00.
The trial court's finding number 27 states in relevant part,
The contract was extended by a total of 85
days as is reflected in supplemental agreement
number 12 to January 8, 198 6. ... At the
time of trial . . . the parties agreed that
15 6 days would be the actual number of
calendar days between the extended date for
completion and June 13, 1986, when time
charges were suspended, . . ..3
(Emphasis added.)
In its Bench Decision, the court stated, "The completion date
was extended 85-calendar days by UDOT in Supplement Agreement No.
12, SA 12, to January 8, 1986."4 Also in the Bench Decision the
2Tab 1 of Addendum to Appellant's brief.
3Tab 3 of Addendum to Appellant's Brief.
4Bench Decision at 9, 11. 2-4. (Emphasis added).
3
Court referred to "some 65 or 70,000" dollars "of continuing
overhead costs."5
Between the trial court's announcement of its Bench Decision
and the entry of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, UDOT
submitted its proposed findings and conclusions. In its proposed
finding no. 31, UDOT referred specifically to "documented
engineering charges totalling $82,631.16" incurred between December
1985 and June 1986. Reliance vigorously objected to that proposed
finding as inconsistent with the stipulated facts and the trial
court's own Bench Decision. The trial court rejected UDOT's
proposed finding no. 31.
UDOT is now attempting to reassert the $82,000.00 figure,
without having cross-appealed or otherwise challenged the trial
court's Bench Decision or Findings. That figure is incorrect and
inaccurate for several reasons. First, the parties stipulated that
the contract completion date was extended to January 8, 1986; the
parties and the trial court used that date as a benchmark at trial
and the trial court specifically referred to that date in its Bench
Decision and Findings. It makes no sense to use the $82,000.00
figure, which includes engineering costs for December 1985, if the
contract completion date was extended to January 8, 1986. If the
December costs are included, then the January 8 completion date is
no longer the extended completion date, and that benchmark date
that the parties and the trial court relied upon throughout the
trial vanishes. UDOT has not proposed a new "extended" completion
5Bench Decision at 12, 11. 14-18.
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date, nor can it, because its "pick-and-choose" approach to when
engineering costs are to be included creates a hiatus in the middle
of the work.
Second, UDOT's $82,000.00 figure represents engineering
charges from December 1, 1985, to June 30, 1986, a period of 212
days, while the $93,600.00 liquidated damages figure to which UDOT
wants to compare the $82,000.00 figure represents liquidated
damages over a period of only 156 days. Comparing $82,000.00 in
engineering costs to $93,600.00 in liquidated damages is like
comparing apples to oranges. Either the $82,000.00 figure should
be compared to liquidated damages of $600.00 a day for 212 days
($127,200.00), or the engineering charges for the 42 day period in
January and February 1986, when liquidated damages were suspended
by UDOT and the Federal Highway Administration, should be deducted
from the $82,000.00 figure. Reliance calculates that the
engineering charges attributable to that 42-day period total
$27,897.05/ Either method leaves a big gap between the liquidated
damages and UDOT's alleged actual damages.
Finally, compounding the inaccuracy of using the $82,000.00
figure is the fact that UDOT would have incurred a substantial
portion of these engineering costs regardless of when Young (the
general contractor and Reliance's principal) completed the
project.7 Reliance took great care at trial and in its Appellant's
6See Exs. 64 and 65, and a copy of Ex. 65 with entries for days
on and between January 14 and February 24, 1986, attached as an
Addendum to this brief.
7RT, pp. 200 - 208.
Brief to show that even the $65,000 figure was overstated. See
Appellant's Brief at pages 33-42, especially pages 39-42. UDOT is
disingenuous to assert as fact that UDOT incurred $82,631.16 in
additional expenses as a result of alleged delay when the facts are
(1) the figure according to the evidence and the court's findings
is $65,029.79, (2) the $82,000 figure includes costs for a 42-day
period during which liquidated damages were suspended, and (3) a
substantial portion of either figure was not a result of the
alleged delayed completion. Each time UDOT cites the $82,000
figure in its brief, it should be disregarded because it is plainly
incorrect and without support.
Another example of alleged facts, while not appearing in
UDOT's statement of facts, requires a response. Sprinkled
throughout UDOT's brief are statements or allegations that somehow
Reliance was responsible for the contractor's late completion of
the project. Those allegations are untrue, unsupported by any
evidence in the record, not mentioned in the court's Bench Decision
or Findings of Fact, and completely irrelevant.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. UDOT occupied much of its brief with arguments about
UDOT's "good faith" in granting time extensions, its freedom from
fault for the late completion, and where fault should lie. These
arguments are irrelevant, distract attention from the true issues,
and are a transparent ploy to elicit sympathy for the State.
Point II. Under Utah law, UDOT's liquidated damages provision
is unenforceable because UDOT's engineering costs were readily
susceptible to calculation and there was no reasonable relationship
between the liquidated damages and UDOT's "increased overhead."
UDOT dodges the doctrine of substantial completion with the
argument that the contract was a completion date contract. This
and other arguments expose UDOT's liquidated damages provision for
what it is: a penalty to coerce completion from contractors.
Point III. It is a reasonable and fair interpretation or
application of Utah law on the subject of liquidated damages that
such damages may not be assessed after a construction project
achieves substantial completion, as this one did.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UDOT's Arguments Regarding Fault for Late
Completion and the Appropriateness of Time
Extensions are Irrelevant, Distracting, and
Improper.
Although substantial completion and the propriety of the
liquidated damages are the determinative and relevant issues, UDOT
occupied much of its brief with irrelevant issues. The relevant
issues on appeal are distinctly stated in Reliance's Brief of
Appellant.8 These issues are: (1) whether substantial completion
is the law in Utah; (2) whether the harm allegedly caused by the
breach was capable and easy to accurately estimate; and (3) whether
there was a reasonable relationship between actual and liquidated
damages and whether the application of the liquidated damages
clause operates as an unenforceable penalty. UDOT agreed with and
*Brief of Appellant, p. 2.
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accepted Reliance's statement of the issues.9 UDOT's brief states,
"The State agrees with the statement of issues presented and
standards of review found in appellant's brief." Notwithstanding
UDOT's explicit acceptance of and agreement with these narrowly
defined issues, UDOT has nevertheless attempted to misstated the
relevant issues and raise several irrelevant issues which were not
addressed at trial and are certainly not properly before this
Court.
Subsection I. B of UDOT's brief, which is entitled, "The Delay
in Completion of the Project was Not the Fault of UDOT," is an
example of an irrelevant issue which UDOT has attempted to
improperly raise on appeal. Who delayed whom is not relevant to
this appeal. The question of who delayed the project was not an
issue at trial; the trial court made no findings on the question
and it certainly is not properly before this Court now.
As another example of an irrelevant issue, subsection I. C of
UDOT's brief is entitled, "Appropriate Extensions of Time were
Granted by UDOT." The appropriateness of time extensions is not
9Brief of Appellee, p. 1.
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relevant.10 What is relevant is whether the liquidated damages are
reasonable or are a penalty.
As a third example of irrelevancies, UDOT, in subsection
III. C of its brief, stated that "UDOT Would Have Suffered a
Penalty Had The [liquidated damages] Not Been Assessed." The
"penalty" UDOT refers to is the prospect of not being reimbursed
for engineering charges it incurred, if the Federal Highway
Administration were not to concur with UDOT's waiver of liquidated
damages. Whether or not UDOT has to bear those costs without
federal reimbursement is irrelevant. What is relevant is whether
the liquidated damages bear any reasonable relationship to its
actual damages. As Reliance has shown, they do not. In fact, the
amount of liquidated damages UDOT is presently holding
$94,800.00—is so much higher than the $65,000.00 in alleged
"actual" damages that UDOT is enjoying a windfall. This assertion
is not only irrelevant, it is also unsupported. There are no
findings of fact that UDOT would have suffered a "penalty."
Further, whether or not UDOT suffered a penalty was not an issue at
trial.
10It was only when the Federal Highway Administration would not
back UDOT with money that UDOT turned against Young's position and
request for a time extension. Up until that point, UDOT advocated
not assessing liquidated damages. See Exs. 58 and 59. Obviously,
UDOT is portraying itself has a beneficent and reasonable
government agency which allowed Young extra time and is attempting
to paint Reliance as an ungrateful troublemaker. A more logical
conclusion from the allowance of the time extension is that there
was an accepted, established basis for the delay and, at least up
to that point, UDOT had accepted responsibility for the delay.
Reliance is concerned that the intent of these arguments is to
appeal to the Court's sympathy for the State of Utah, and that the
effect of these irrelevant arguments will be to distract this Court
from focusing its attention on the truly relevant questions before
it. Reliance urges the Court to dismiss UDOT's irrelevant-
arguments for the improper ploys they are. The following two
issues are those on appeal and those to which we request the Court
to devote its attention.
Point II
UDOT's Liquidated Damages Were Improperly
Assessed Because (1) The Harm Alleged was
Easily Estimated, (2) There was No Reasonable
Relationship Between Actual and Liquidated
Damages, and (3) the Liquidated Damages
Operated as a Penalty
The liquidated damages in this case were improperly assessed
because the harm alleged was easily estimated and there was no
reasonable relationship between the actual and liquidated damages.
Further, as applied to completion date contracts, the liquidated
damages operate as an improper penalty.
1. The Harm Alleged was Easily Estimated
UDOT misapplies the rule that whether or not liquidated
damages are reasonable is to be considered in light of the facts
known to the parties at the time of contracting. The cases cited
by UDOT for that rule are not Utah cases applying Restatement of
Contracts § 339. None of the published opinions in those cases
dealt with facts similar to those in this case, where UDOT had at
the time of contracting the requisite data to predict its actual
damages with reasonable accuracy. The undisputed facts presented
10
at trial established that the harm of which UDOT complains—its
engineering overhead—was highly capable of being accurately
estimated at the time the contract was executed. For over 30
years, UDOT has kept detailed records of its engineering charges on
each federally aided project.11 UDOT uses these records to bill
the federal government for reimbursement of a percentage of these
costs.12 This project was a federally aided project.13 UDOT keeps
ledgers that show the charges in various categories for each day,
down to the penny.14 The information can be produced to show the
totals for a six-month period or can be extracted to show the
totals for one month.15
UDOT argues that its records do not distinguish between
"increased" engineering cost and costs that would be incurred
regardless of late completion, and therefore that the liquidated
damages meet the Restatement test. But the evidence referred to
above demonstrates that UDOT has enough data to know at the time of
contracting what its engineering costs are likely to be at various
stages of a project. Moreover, UDOT knows that many of the
engineering charges incurred at the end of a delayed project would
nRT, p. 412, 11. 17-21.
12RT, p. 408, 11. 14-25.
13Ex. 53; RT, pp. 162-163.
14Exs. 64 & 65.
15RT, p. 373, 1. 9, through p. 374, 1. 24; p. 408, 11-20; p.
412, 11. 17-21; and Exs. 64 & 65.
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be incurred regardless of the delay.16 Therefore, UDOT cannot say
that its liquidated damages, which are assessed at the same rate
regardless of the stage of the project, are a reasonable estimate
of the damages it will incur. Because the "damage" was capable of
closer estimation than the liquidated damages provision, the
assessment of liquidated damages fails the Restatement of Contracts
test established by the Utah Supreme Court.17
2. There was No Reasonable Relationship Between Actual and
Liquidated Damages
UDOT's assessment of liquidated damages also fails because
UDOT's actual damages bear no reasonable relationship to the
liquidated damages. This Court has established that liquidated
damages must bear some reasonable relationship to the actual
damages.18 Reliance's arguments in this respect, particularly with
regard to the fact that a large proportion of the engineering
charges would have been incurred whether or not the completion date
was delayed, are contained in great detail on pp. 32-49 of
Reliance's Appellant's Brief.
,6RT at 200-208.
17" [A liquidated damages clause] is not enforceable as a
contract and does not affect the damages recoverable for the
breach, unless . . . (b) the harm that is caused by the breach is
one that is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation."
Restatement of Contracts § 339. Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623
(Utah 1982) ; Johnson v. Carman, 572 p.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1977) ;
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Ut. 4 68, 47 6-77, 243 P.2d 446, 450-51
(1952). See Appellant's Brief at 25-29.
uYoung Electric Sign Co. v. United Standard West Inc. , 755
P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988) ; Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 397
(Utah 1986). See Appellant's Brief at 29-31.
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In response to Reliance's arguments UDOT attempts to add back
in various engineering charges, including charges of $36,000,
allegedly incurred during a period for which liquidated damages
were not assessed by UDOT. There is not enough evidence in the
record to determine whether it is appropriate to compare these
alleged additional costs with the liquidated damages that UDOT
assessed. It is not clear what the nature of the costs is, or
whether they would have been incurred regardless of late
completion. Neither are the costs referred to in the trial court's
findings. An additional weakness is that, if these costs are
included, they suggest an embarrassing inefficiency in UDOT's
contract administration. Adding $36,000 to the $65,000 figure
means it cost UDOT over $100,000 to oversee $350,000 of work.
Reliance has pointed out the implications of these charges in the
Appellant's Brief at pages 48-49: either the engineering charges
(and the liquidated damages which are based on them) are
unreasonably excessive, or the engineering charges include a large
amount of costs that are not attributable to late completion and
are therefore not "increased overhead."19
19The trial court made no findings on the dollar amount of work
left to be completed at the extended completion date of January 8,
1986. UDOT's brief at pages 31-32 attempts to challenge Reliance's
figures regarding the amount of work left to be completed. UDOT
cites only one exhibit (Ex. 34). Reliance's calculations are based
on the testimony of UDOT's own project engineer, and were carefully
documented to the trial transcript. See Appellant's Brief at 48-
49.
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The disparity between actual damages and the liquidated damages is
a particularly embarrassing—and telling—weakness in UDOT's case.
But it may not be the most important weakness.
3. The Liquidated Damages Operated as a Penalty
Reliance urges the Court to keep in mind that UDOT's
liquidated damage specification specifically designates "increased
overhead" as the sole basis for an assessment of liquidated
damages. UDOT has contractually limited itself to assess
liquidated damages based solely on "increased overhead."
Nevertheless, UDOT has argued in its brief that other areas of
damage are grounds for assessing liquidated damages. Among these,
UDOT argues, are the potential damage to its relationship with the
Federal Highway Administration and to its credibility with other
contractors. As important as they may be, these other aspects of
damages are irrelevant because they are not the basis for assessing
liquidated damages that UDOT bound itself to by contract.
Moreover, they are speculative, and there is no evidence to support
them in the record other than speculation by UDOT witnesses.
The most significant reason for UDOT's assessment of
liquidated damages emerged in UDOT's brief. While saying that
"UDOT's liquidated damages provision is not intended to induce
timely performance," UDOT argued that the liquidated damages
specification regarding completion date contracts leaves no room
for the doctrine of substantial completion. This specification
makes the liquidated damage provision a penalty when applied to a
completion date contract.
14
UDOT argues in pages 26-27 of its brief that "completion date"
contracts are different from working day or calendar day contracts.
As part of its attempt to duck the doctrine of substantial
completion, UDOT emphasizes that on completion date contracts,
"substantial completion" and "final completion" are the same. In
support of its position UDOT quotes the Ledbetter case for the
notion that liquidated damage provisions are an "appropriate means
of inducing due performance." UDOT's argument thus exposes the
true rationale behind its liquidated damages provision: to cudgel
contractors into completing their contracts.
This purpose of UDOT's liquidated damages provision is
essentially what Bert Taylor said in his memorandum to the Federal
Highway Administration: "There are other times when either the
public or UDOT is experiencing inconveniences and full liquidated
damages should apply to force the contractor into completion."20
The evidence at trial and the arguments in UDOT's brief show that
UDOT gives only lip service to the concept that its specification
is to compensate it for its "increased overhead." Instead, it is
obvious that UDOT looks upon its liquidated damages provision as a
club to induce performance.
This attitude of "complete or penalize" is also borne out by
UDOT's argument that the liquidated damages provisions are applied
to completion date contracts more stringently than to working day
or calendar day contracts. At pages 28 and 29 of its brief, UDOT
argues that a project continues to accrue overhead costs until it
20Ex. 59; RT pp. 164-166 (emphasis added)
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is fully completed. But that same accrual of costs would be true
also of working day and calendar day contracts. UDOT also argues
that under a completion date contract, liquidated damages are
assessable until the project is 100% complete. UDOT's liquidated
damages provision is blind and deaf when it comes to the amount of
work remaining to be done on the project. Under UDOT's view, the
same $600.00 a day charge applies whether the remaining work is
substantial or trivial, and whether UDOT's engineering costs in
overseeing the work are great or insignificant.
Utah law is clear that liquidated damages provisions that
impose the same amount of damages for failure to perform duties of
varying degrees of importance are a penalty and are
unenforceable.21 Under the factors of this case and applicable
Utah law, UDOT's assessment of liquidated damages operates as a
penalty by intent and by operation.
Point III
The Doctrine of Substantial Completion Should
be Applied Because (1) UDOT's Specifications
Allow for Substantial Completion, (2) the
Lower Court's Findings Show that the Proj ect
was Substantially Completed, and (3) the Law
of Substantial Completion Should Apply in Utah
In this case, the applicable law of liquidated damages
includes UDOT's own specifications, which permit application of the
doctrine of substantial completion. The existing law also
recognizes that a liquidated damages provision that imposes the
21S_ee cases cited in Appellant's Brief at 42-46, particularly
Western Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Fiore, 47 Utah 108, 151 P.984 (Utah
1915).
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same dollar amount of damages for the breach of duties of varying
importance, operates as a penalty. It is a reasonable and fair
interpretation and extension of that law to hold that a liquidated
damages provision in a construction contract that imposes the same
dollar amount of damages after a construction project achieves
substantial completion as before is a penalty and unenforceable.
1^ UDOT's Specifications Allow for Substantial Completion
In three separate places in the brief, UDOT states, "The
contract contemplates that substantial completion and final
completion are one and the same." This is an equative sentence.
Rephrased, it reads, "Substantial completion is final completion."
This is precisely the point of the Doctrine of Substantial
Completion. Substantial completion is final completion in the eyes
of the law, for purposes of cutting off the assessment of
liquidated damages.
Particularly on a complex, multi-million dollar project such
as the emergency grade raise project, it is naive to assert a
concept of "final completion" as a definitive, bright-line
occurrence or something capable of precise measurement. In reality
and practice, when the work is completed is a subjective
evaluation. Because of the subjective nature of determining when
final completion occurs, the line must be drawn somewhere, and the
law has chosen to draw that line with the pen of equity using the
Doctrine of Substantial Completion as the measure.
17
As a practical matter, UDOT's own specifications recognize
that "final completion" is a subjective matter. UDOT's liquidated
damages specifications used on this project state:
The daily time charge will cease . . - [w]hen
final acceptance has been duly made by the
engineer as prescribed in subsection 105.16.22
In other words, the contract's completion for purposes of
liquidated damages is subjectively made by the engineer when the
engineer issues its final acceptance. Couple this subjective
determination by the engineer with the express statement in Section
108.08 that "the department may waive such portions of the
liquidated damages as may occur after the work is in condition for
safe and convenient use by the traveling public, " and it is
reasonable to conclude that UDOT's own specifications apply the
principle of substantial completion. UDOT's own brief states,
"UDOT recognizes that . . . substantial completion. . . is a valid
concept and may apply in cases which do not specify a completion
date. . .."23 UDOT's rigid application of liquidated damages to
completion date contracts is a penalty and unenforceable under
applicable Utah law which deals with the issue of liquidated
damages. There is therefore no justification for construing UDOT's
specifications as not accommodating substantial completion, even
for completion date contracts.
22Ex. 4, § 160.06.
"Appellee's Brief at 27.
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2. The Lower Court Found Sufficient Facts to Determine that the
Project was Substantially Complete
In this case, the lower court found sufficient facts to show
that there was substantial completion. Although not using the
words "substantially complete," the court found in its Findings of
Fact, paragraph 28, "paving was completed by Young on October 25,
1985." The court amplified this Finding of Fact in its April 15,
1991 Bench Decision, in which the court stated:
All asphalt surfacing work was completed on
the project on October 25, 1985, at which
time, the road was opened for, essentially
full use by the traveling public.24
The court's finding is fully supported by the statement of
UDOT's own engineer, who concurred with the characterization, that
"on October 25, 1985, the laying of the asphalt was completed and
the motoring public had full use of the entire roadway" and "that
even though the signing was not completed until that date, January
13, 1986, the lack of signing did not prevent UDOT from opening up
the highway for full unrestricted public use on the earlier date,
October 25, 1985" and "that after signing was completed by January
13, 198 6, there was no inconvenience to the public's use of the
highway. "25
UDOT argues at page 30 of its brief that the project was not
substantially complete because the topsoil work remained to be
24P. 8, 11. 18-21.
-RT, p. 190, 11. 5-20. Although it is true that John Nye
merely concurred with these statements which were made by United
Pacific's counsel, it should also be pointed out that these
statements were taken verbatim from statements made by Mr. Nye in
his deposition.
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done. UDOT stated that "the impact on the general public and UDOT"
of topsoil placement and seeding was "significant." That
characterization contradicts the testimony of UDOT's own project
engineer quoted above. It finds no support in the evidence and the
trial court made no findings on the subject. In fact, the trial
court's Bench Decision quoted above conforms to the testimony of
UDOT's project engineer.
3. The Law of Substantial Completion Should Apply in Utah
Under prevailing case law and according to the lower court's
Findings of Fact and Bench Decision, this project was substantially
complete on October 25, 1985. However, the lower court erred, as
a matter of law, in its conclusion of law:
The court concludes that the doctrine of
substantial completion does not apply to the
facts of this case nor is there case law in
the State of Utah to that effect.26
Notwithstanding this apparent error, UDOT has attempted to argue
that the lower court did not rule that substantial completion does
not apply in Utah, but merely ruled that substantial completion
does not apply to these facts.27 This appeal presents an
26Conclusions of Law, 5 5.
"Although UDOT apparently interprets the Conclusion of Law as
the lower court conceding, at least, that the law of substantial
completion is available for use in Utah, the court's April 15, 1991
Memorandum Decision does not appear to agree:
Plaintiff has asserted that the Doctrine of
Substantial Completion ought to be applied in
this case. No Utah cases have been pointed to
where that is the applicable doctrine in the
State of Utah. The court concludes, from a
reading of a number of Utah cases, that that
is not the law in the State of Utah. P. 9,
11. 10-16 (emphasis added).
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opportunity to this Court to clearly state that the doctrine of
substantial completion is the law in Utah and is applicable under
the facts and circumstances in this case.
The doctrine of substantial completion is a fair and
reasonable application of the existing law and should apply in
Utah, as extensively explained in Reliance's original brief.28 In
support of its argument that substantial completion is not the law
in Utah, UDOT relies on the absence of a specific case whose facts
and holding are precisely tailored to the case before this Court.
Although the Stephens v. Doxey29 case does not precisely coincide
with the facts of the case before this Court, the reasoning and
analysis of the Stephens case are the same reasoning and analysis
which urge application of the doctrine of substantial completion in
the case before this Court. Further, nearly all jurisdictions that
have examined the issue have accepted the doctrine of substantial
completion.
The principles of substantial completion are the same as the
principles of the existing Utah cases: a liquidated damages
provision must not impose the same measure of damages for the
failure to complete trivial or inconsequential work as for the
failure to complete work of an important nature. It must
compensate for loss, not penalize. Applying those principles to
this case would prevent UDOT from assessing liquidated damages
related to work of an inconsequential nature, both in dollar amount
2sBrief of Appellant, pp. 12-18.
29198 P. 261 (Utah 1921) .
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and in impact on the public, after the construction project
achieved substantial completion. That point in time would be
October 25, 1985. Applying these principles would also eliminate
the draconian result of charging damages when the public had
unrestricted use of the roadway. That is the criterion of
substantial completion acknowledged by UDOT in its brief: the
project is available for its intended use.30
We request that this Court follow the well reasoned and
equitable decisions of the vast majority of jurisdictions which
have applied the doctrine of substantial completion to similar
facts, such as the S. L. Rowland Construction Co. v. Beall Pipe &
Tank Corp. case, which held:
We hold that a liquidated damage clause in a
. construction contract, which requires
the contractor to pay the same $150 daily rate
of damages after the [contract] was put into
full operation as before, amounted to a
penalty after the [contract] was put into full
use. The clause was, therefore, invalid
insofar as it purported to determine damages
after the line was put into full use by the
municipality.31
Reliance has discussed the law and facts that support its
position. Even more telling is UDOT's admission that the
liquidated damages should not have been assessed. This admission
came in the form of a written petition to FHWA from Mr. Bert L.
Taylor, who was UDOT's Engineer for Construction, in favor of the
Doctrine of Substantial Completion:
30Appellee's Brief at 25-26.
3114 Wash. App. 297, 540 P.2d 912, 921-922 (1975).
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UDOT's position on the above problem is we
feel there should be some flexibility in the
charging of liquidated damages. There are
times when neither the public nor UDOT is
inconvenienced by the extension of time and
the position of Mr. Howell [substantial
completion] seems to be the correct one.
There are other times when either the public
or UDOT is experiencing inconveniences and
full liquidated damages should apply to force
the contractor into completion.32
Implicit in Mr. Taylor's plea for the application of the doctrine,
"There are other times . . ." is that this situation is not one of
those other times that merits liquidated damages. UDOT's Engineer
for Construction said it: "There are times when neither the public
nor UDOT is inconvenienced by the extension of time" and
substantial completion is the correct position.
CONCLUSION
Young was the successful, competitive bidder on an emergency
grade raise project. Young's bid was the lowest bid at
$9,940,893.25—$2,243,812.25 lower than UDOT's own engineer's
estimate of $12,184,705.50. Young substantially completed the work
amid the rising flood waters of the Great Salt Lake and saved the
vital East/West link on time and in the nick of time. By the
completion date, the public had "full, unrestricted use" of the
roadway and "there was no inconvenience to the public's use."
UDOT, having originally advocated the non-assessment of
liquidated damages against Young, later sought to assess the
liquidated damages—ostensibly based on "increased overhead."
However, UDOT's provision for liquidated damages is contrary to law
32 Ex. 59; RT, pp. 164-166.
23
and equity because (1) the harm alleged was easily estimated
according to UDOT's own records, (2) there was no reasonable
relationship between actual and liquidated damages, and (3) the
liquidated damages operated as an extreme penalty.
The Doctrine of Substantial Completion is a reasonable
application of existing Utah Law that would render UDOT's
liquidated damages provision unenforceable. Liquidated damages
should not be assessed after the project achieved substantial
completion and the public had full and unrestricted use of the
roadway.
Therefore, appellant Reliance Insurance Company respectively
requests a reversal of the lower court's ruling.
Dated this 22nd day of May, 1992.
FETZER, HENDRICKSON & SIMONSEN
6^ nuAtu
Clark B. Fetzer
Attorneys for Appellant Reliance
Insurance Company
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 22nd
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213-000 588*-0 0 0619 OOOOO 000 OOOOO 610 B 826*552 86/01/10
213-000 5E8*-0 0619 610 1 OHfc-R 86/0^/3*
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IR 00B03 95 102 GROUPED INTERSTATE
OOOOO 000 OOOOO 612 8 81715- 86/01/02
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OOOOO 000 OOOOO 612
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OOOOO 610 2 898109 86/06/27
MINOR SUETOTAL
SUBTOTAL
001*0 161 5 041161 86/04/04
MINOR SUBTOTAL
OOOOO 161 1 041099 86/04/04
OOOOO 161 1 041099 86/04/04
MINOR SUBTOTAL
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































87.02 94. 17 81.95
159.43 94.17 150.14
25.87 94. 17 24.36
188.9B 94. 17 177.96
73.93 94.17 69.62
276.35 94. 17 260.24
690.29 94.17 650.05
61.55 94. 17 57.96






























































































































































































27t.35 94. 17 260.24
23.OS 94. 17 21.73
20. 19 94. 17 19.01
152.34 94.17 143.46
809.69 30304.01 94.17 28537.26
40.12 94. 17 37.78
9.39 9., 17
2,17 9-. 17 2.04
16.35 9-. 17 15.40
47.63 9-. 17 44.65
206.54 9-. 17
136,04 94. 17
7*. 13 9*. 17 69.El
31.37 94. :7 29.54
173.99 9*. 17









55.60 94. 17 52.36
18.03 94. 17 16.93
78.18 94. 17
97.72 94. 17
3*2.29 94. 17 322.33
1484.33 94. 17
11.93 94. 17 11.23
IE.26 94. 17 17.20
22.53 94. 17 21.22
207.71 94. 17
79.18*-






















































5 052741 86/05 'lb| 053658 8fc/05 3D
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OBJ STR PHA HOURS DIV SRC DOC DATE N-PARTIC DEFERRED
0410 OOOOO 021 1 012099 86/01/24 125.91
0410 OOOOO B5B 1 012099 86/01/24
0410 OOOOO 027 1 012099 86/01/24
0410 OOOOO 021 1 012099 86/01/24
0410 00999 424 OOOOO 741 1 011099 86/01/10
0410 01717 424 OOOOO 741 1 012099 86/01/24
0410 01717 424 OOOOO 741 1 011099 86/01/10 247.04
0410 01717 424 OOOOO 741 1 011099 86/01/10
0410 01717 424 OOOOO 741 1 012099 86/01/24 • 91.14
0410 00999 424 OOOOO 741 1 0110-99 66/01'10 15.27
0410 OOOOC 027 1 012099 86/01/24 87.93
0410 OOOOO 022 1 012099 B6/01/24 51.72
0410 OOOOO 86B 1 021099 86/02/07
0410 OOOOC 818 1 021099 86/02/07 22.64
0-10 OOOOO 027 1 021099 86/02/07
0410 OOOOO C21 1 021099 86/02/07
0410 OOOOO 866 1 021099 86/02/07 29.67
0410 OOOOC 021 1 021099 86/02/07 42.28
0410 OOOOO B5B 1 022099 86/02/21
0410 OOOOO 027 1 022099 86/02/21 175.02
0410 OOOOO 85B 1 022099 86/02/21 1535.63
0410 OOOOO 027 1 022099 66/02/21
021099 86/02/070410 OOOOO 85B 1
0410 OOOOO 027 1 021099 86/02/07 122.33
0410 OOOOO E5B 1 021099 86/C2/07 2131.06
0410 OOOOO 81B 1 021099 86/02/07
0410 00999 424 OOOOO 741 1 021099 86/02'C7 67.55
0-10 00999 424 OOOOO 741 1 021099 86/02/07
0410 OOOOO 161 1 041099 66/0*'0* 40.49
041C OOOOO E7B 1 041099 Sb/04'0* 74. IB
otic oocoo 676 1 042099 Bb/04'18 57.2S
0410 OC00O C27 1 042099 8b/04'18
0410 OOOOO 027 1 041099 86/04/0* 719.50
0410 OOOOO 87B 1 041099 B6/O4/04
0410 OOOOO 021 1 0*2099 86/04/18 46.98
041C OOOOO 161 1 041099 66/04/0-
04 10 OOOOO B7B 1 042099 86/04/18
O410 OOOOO 027 1 0*2099 86/0*'18 154.83
04 I C OOOOO 027 1 041099 86/04/0*
0410 OOOOO C21 1 042099 86/04'IS
04lC OOOOO 021 1 032099 8b '03 '21 28.19
0410 OOOOO 876 1 032099 66/03 '21


























































35 .78 54.17 33.69
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ACCOUNT AUTH OBJ STR PHA HOURS DIV SRC DOC DATE
213-000 5BS5-0 0 0603 OOOOO OOOOO 85B 2 862742 86/06/30
213-000 5885 0603 HI NOR SUBTOTAL
213-000 5B85-1 0605 1- OOOOO 511 1 027933 65/12/31213-000 5665-1 N 0605
^
OOOOO 511 1 027933 85/12/31213-000 5885-1 H 0605 OOOOO 511 1 027939 86/02/28213-000 5885-1 0605 ODOOO 511 1 027927 85/09/30213-000 5865-1 N 0605 00000 511 1 027927 B5/O9/30213-000 5865-1 N 0605 OOOOO 511 027928 85 '10/31213-000 5885-1 N 0605 OOOOC 511 i 027^21 85/08/31213-000 5885-1 0605 OOOOO 511 1 C27921 85/08/31213-000 5885-1 0605 OOOOO 5:1 1 027676 85/07/31213-000 5S85-1 0605 OOOOO 798 1 027E76 85/07/31213-000 5685-1 0605 OOOOO 511 1 02792B 85/10/31213-OOC 5865-1 N 0605






027876 85/07/312J3-0OO 5865-1 0605 i OOOOO 511 1 027948 86/04/30213-000 5885-1 0605 OOODO 511 1 027939 86/02/28213-000 5885-1 N 0605 Mr OOOOO 511 1 027948 Bfc/04/30213-000 5865-1 0605
/- OOOOO 511 1 027929 85/11/30213-000 5865-1 N 0605 OOOOO 511 1 027929 65/11/30
213-0G0 5885 0605 nf^ MINOR SUBTOTAL
213-000 5865-0 0 0619 OOOOO OOOOO 855 2 862292 86/04/18213-OOC 5865-0 0 0619 00000 OOOOO £5B 2 862070 86/02/26
213-OO0 5885 0619
-^ MINOR SUBTOTAL
213-OOC 58S5-0 0 0623 60000 000C7 C27 1 021097 86/02/23213-000 58B5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00005 85B 1 021097 86/02/23
213-O0O 5885-0 0 0623 CDOOO OOOOfc 027 1 021097 66/02/232:3-000 5BE5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00005 85B 1 021D97 86/02/23
213-000 5685-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00053 027 1 021097 86/02/23
213-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00595 85B 1 021097 86/02/23213-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00900 85B 1 021097 B6/02/23
2I3-OO0 58E5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00810 856 1 021089 66/02/07213-OO0 58E5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00640 85B 1 O2I0B9 86/02/07213-0O0 5SE5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00078 027 1 021089 86/02/072:3-000 5665-0 0 0623 OOOCO 00005 E58 1 021090 86/02/07213-C00 5^85-0 0 06T3 OOOOO 00005 85B 1 C21090 86/C2/07












































10. 13 94.17 9.54
67.S8 94,17 82. 7b
15.24 94.17 1-.35
60.28 94.17 56.77
184.34 9*. 17 173.59






31.53 9*. 17 29.69
86.03 9*. 17 B2.90




































































































































































































































































































































































ACCOUNT AUTH OBJ STR PHA HOURS DIV SRC DOC DATE N-PARTIC DEFERRED
213-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00005 65B 1 021070 86/01/07
213-OOC 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00056 027 1 020169 86/01/07
213-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO O0O04 65B 1 021070 B6/O1/07
213-000 58E5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00O05 85B 1 021105 86/03/08
213-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00530 85B 1 021124 66/03/25
213-000 58E5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00078 741 1 091429 86/03/21
213-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00005 65B 1 021124 66/03/25
213-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00005 85B 1 021124 66/03/25
213-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00005 858 1 021105 B6/03/0S '
213-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00041 027 1 021125 86/03/26
213-000 5685-C 0 0623 OOOOO 00061 027 1 021125 66/03/26
213-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO OO750 85B 1 021105 86/03/08
213-000 58E5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00600 B5B 1 021105 86/03/08
213-000 5865-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00036 021 1 021173 86/06/13
213-000 58B5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00005 B5B 1 021173 86/06/13
213-000 5SS5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00214 027 1 021177 86/06/30
213-OOC 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00005 858 1 021173 86/06/13
213-000 5B85-0 0623 027 2 861213 86/06/30
213-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00005 856 1 021176 86/06/29
213-000 5885 0623^.^ lA* MINOR SUBTOTAL
213-000 5885-0 N 0625 OOOOO OOOOO 027 1 021107 86/03/11 567 35
213-000 5885-0 N 0625 OOOOO OOOOO 027 1 021107 66/03/11 529 32
213-OOC 5885-0 N 0625 OOOOO OOOOO 741 1 091433 86/03/31 189 88
213-ODO 5885-0 0 0625 OOOOO OOOOO 741 1 091416 86/01/31
213-000 5685-0 N 0625 OOOOO OOOOO 741 1 091453 86/05/31 45 42
213-000 5885-0 H 0625 741 1 0369-R 66/04/30 265 04
213-000 53B5-C 0625 741 1 0369-R 86/04/30
213-000 58B5-0 N 0625 OOOOO OOOOO 741 1 091440 86/04/30 766 65
213-000 5E85-0 N 0625 741 1 091467 86/06/30 136 26
213-OOD 5665-0 0 0625 OOOOO OOOOO 027 1 021175 86/06/30
213-000 5B85 0625
.\*p>" HIKOR SUBTOTAL 2499 92
213-000 58B5- 0629 OOOOO 000 OOOOO 85B 8 862220 B6/04/10
213-000 58E5- 0629 OOOOO 000 OOOOO E5B 8 B62290 86/04/2*
213-000 5885- 062« OOOOO 000 OOOOO 859 8 862*18 86/05/23
213-OCO 5385- 0629 OOOOO 000 OOOOO 85S 8 862350 86/05/13
213-000 5SB5- 0629 OOOOO 000 OOOOO 85B 8 862599
861754
86/07/09
213-000 5835- 0629 OOOOO 000 OOOOO 858 8 86/01/08
213-000 5885- 0629 OOOOO 000 OOOOO 858 8 861B23 66/01/23
213-000 5BB5- 0629 OOOOO 000 OOOOO 85B 6 B6213C B6/03/16
PARTIC PCT FED PARTIC
25.00 94.17 23.54
174.30 94.17 164.14
40,50 94. 17 3B.14
211.56 94.17 199.23





25.00 94. 17 23.54






7.74CF 94. 17 7.29CR
7.00 94.17 6.59
17.85 94.17 16.81
14.94 94. 17 14.07
175.50 94.17 165.27













































































































































































OBJ STR PHA HOURS DIV SRC DOC DATE
0629 OOOOO OOO OOOOO
0629 OOOOO 000 OOOOO
0629 OOOOO 000 OOOOO
0629 OOOOO 000 OOOOO
0629 OOOOO 000 OOOOO
B5B 8 862062 86/03/06
B5B 8 B61897 66/02/19
B5B 8 861909 66/02/19
65B 8 862725 66/07/25
















0644 OOOOO 000 OOOOO
0644 OOOOO 000 OOOOO
0644 00006
0644 OOOOO 000 OOOOO
0644 OOOOO 000 OOOOO
0644 OOOOO 000 OOOOO
V
85B 8 86B818 86/02/03
85B 2 817792 86/02/28
85B 2 817754 86/02/2B
85B 2 817794 B6/02/26
85B 2 814953 86/06/30
85B 2 814941 86/06/30
HINOR SUBTOTAL
85B B 868870 86/02/21
85B 8 669561 86/06/18
B5B 1 186018 66/01/07
858 8 B6B959 B6/03/10
658 8 B69062 B6/03/14
85B 8 869277 86/05/13
MINOR SUBTOTAL
<^"
00D96 B5B 1 186018 86/01/07
85B 1 I8601B B6'01/07




0659 OOOOO 000 OOOOO














85B 1 027920 86/05/31
85B 1 027937 86/06/30
85B 8 868947 86/03/11
MINOR SUBTOTAL
00001 B5B 1 IB6018 86/01/07
N-PARTIC
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ACCOUNT AUTH OBJ STR PHA HOURS DIV SRC DOC DATE N-PARTIC
213-000 5885-0 0 0733 OOOOO OOOOO 612 1 0809 34 66/01/22
213-000 5885-0 0 0733 OOOOO OOOOO 612 1 080934 86/01/22
213-000 5885-0 N 0733 OOOOO OOOOO 612 1 080934 86/01/22 54 02
213-000 5885-0 0 0733 OOOOO OOOOO 612 1 080937 86/02/26
213-000 5885 0733 HINOR SUBTOTAL 54 02
213-000 5885 SUBTOTAL 17930 73
214-000 5865-0 N 0401 OO060 022 5 012022 86/01/24 94 78
214-000 5885-0 N 0401 00060 022 5 012022 86/01/2* 101 97
214-000 5885-0 N 0401 00040 022 5 021022 B6/02/07 51 57
214-000 5885-0 N 0401 00040 022 5 021022 86/02/07 44 50
214-000 5885-0 N 0401 00080 C22 5 022022 86/02/21 113 30
214-000 5885-0 H 0401 00040 022 5 022022 66/02/21 51 57
214-000 5885-0 N 0401 00040 022 021022 66/02/07 44 50
214-000 5865-0 H 0401 00040 022 5 032022 86/03/21 51 57
214-000 5685-0 N 0401 00040 022 5 032022 86/03/21 56 65
214-000 58B5-0 N 0401 00040 022 5 032022 B6/03/21 46 19
214-000 5885-0 N 0401 00040 022 5 032022 86/03/21 44 50
214-000 5885-0 0401 0OO40 022 5 052022 86/05/16
214-000 5885-0 0401 00040 022 052022 86/05/16
214-000 5885-0 0401 00999 604 0006 0 541 £ 051541 86/05/02
214-000 5885-0 0401 00999 604 00030 541 5 051541 86/05/02
214-000 5885-0 H 0401 0002 0 022 £ 052022 B6/D5/16 33 99
214-000 5885-0 N 0401 00020 022 J 052022 86/05/16 28 32
214-000 5865-0 0401 00020 022 5 052022 86/05/16
214-000 5885-0 0401 00040 022 5 052022 86/05/16
214-000 5885-0 0401 00020 022 5 052022 66/05/16
214-000 58B5-0 0401 00999 604 00020 541 5 051541 86/05/02
214-000 5885-0 0401 00999 604 00040 541 5 042541 86/04'16
214-000 5885-0 0401 00999 604 00040 541 5 042541 86/04/16
214-000 5885-0 N 0401 00040 022 5 042022 86/04/18 59 22
214-000 5885-0 N 0401 OO040 022 042022 86/04/18 56 65
214-000 5885-0 H 0401 00040 022 5 O42022 86/04/18 44 50
214-000 56B5-0 0401 00999 604 O0O80 541 5 063541 86/06/30
214-000 5885 0401 HINOR SUBTOTAL 923 76
214-000 5885-0 H 0410 00999 604 OOOOO 541 1 042099 86/04/18 69 51
214-000 5885-0 h 0*10 OOOOO 022 1 042099 86/04/18 17 21
214-000 5885-0 0410 00999 604 OOOOO 541 1 042099 86/04/18
214-000 5885-0 H 0410 OOOOO 022 1 042099 86/04/18 74 62
214-000 5E85-0 0410 OOOOO 022 1 052099 86/05/16





ACCOUNT AUTH OBJ STR PHA HOURS DIV SRC DOC. DATE N-PARTIC DEFERRED
214-000 5865-0 N 0410 OOOOO 022 1 052C99
1 052099
86/05/16 6 69
214-000 5885-0 N 0410 OOOOO 022 86/05/16 151 30
214-000 5865-0 N 0410 OOOOO 022 1 052099 86/05/16 28 99
214-000 5885-0 N 0410 00999 604 OOOOO 541 1 051099 86/05/02 92 98
214-000 5885-0
5885-0
O410 00999 604 OOOOO 541 1 051099 86/05/02
214-000 N 0410 OOOOO 022 1 032099 86/03/21 2! 55214-000 5865-0 H 0-10 OOOOO 022 1 032099 86/03/21 34
214-000 5885-0 N 0410 OOOOO 022 1 022099 86/02/21 17 69
214-000 5885-0 N 0410 OOOOO 022 1 0Z1099
1 022099
86/02/07 65 41
214-000 5885-0 H 0410 OOOOO 022 86/02/21 76 71
214-000 5885-0 N 0410 OOOOO 022 1 OOJ099
1 012099
86/02/07 15 08
214-000 5885-0 N 0410 OOOOO 022 86/01/24 91 55
214-000 5885-0 N 0410 OOOOO 022 1 012099 86/01/24 21 11
214-000 5885-0 0410 00999 604 OOOOO 541 1 062099 B6/06/30
214-000 5885-0 N 0410 00999 604 OOOOO 541 1 062099 16/06/30 94 02
214-000 5S65 0410 HINOR SUBTOTAL 936 76
214-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00005 022 1 021080 86/01/24
214-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00035 022 1 021080 86/01/24
214-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00115 022 1 021100 86/02/26
214-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00075 022 1 021091 86/02/07
214-000 5865-0 0623 022 1 0367-R 86/C2/2B
214-000 58B5-0 N 0623 022 1 0367-R 86/02/26 72 20
214-000 5685-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00030 022 1 021127 86/03/27
214-000 58B5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00060 022 1 021145 86/04/11
214-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00025 022 1 021170 86/05/16
214-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00002 022 1 021170 86/05/16
214-000 5BB5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00055 541 1 02791B 66/05/02
214-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00002 022 1 021170 86/05/16
214-000 5885-0 0 0623 ocooo 00002 022 1 021170 86/05/16
214-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00001 022 1 021170 86/05/16
214-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00127 541 1 027918 86/05/02
214-000 58B5-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00060 022 1 C21I70 B6/05/16
214-000 5885-0 0 0623 OOOOO 00002 541 1 027918 86/05/02
214-000 5885 0623 HIHOR SUBTOTAL 72 20
214-000 58B5-0 N 0663 00001 022 1 186032 86/03/11 34 13
214-000 5885-0 0663 00001 022 1 186012 86/01/C3
214-000 5BB5-0 0663 00002 022 1 186052 86/05/10
214-000 5685-0 066 3 0OO05 022 1 IS6062 B6/06/C1
214-000 5885-0 0663 000C2 022 1 166062 86/06/C1
214-OO0 5885 0663 MINOR SUBTOTAL 34 13
214-000 5885 SUBTOTAL 1966 87
$253.47
RUh OAT £ 10.17,8b
PAGE NO 1761















































































130.00 94.17 122.42 ***
7.00 94.17 6.59 •••
43.70 9*. 17 41.15 •••




11.40 94.17 10.74 • •a
22.BO 94.17 21.47 •••
9.50 94,17 6.95 • ••
34.00 94. 17 32.02 aaa
9.90 94.17 9.32 «••
39.00 94.17 36.73 aaa
34.00 94.17 32.02 aaa
34.00 94.17 32.02 •••
22.86 94.17 21.53 •*•
12.60 94.17 11.E7 •-aa






67.74 9*.17 63.79 • *•
153.73 94. 17 144.77 aaa











OBJ STR PHA HOURS DIV SRC DOC DATE




NDEX 5886 PROJECT ID 00156 62 392 GROUPED INTERSTATE
















































































































































































1245 19 94 17 1172 60
12*5 19 94 17 1172 60
20015.75 299185 38 51435 74 94 17 48437 00
DATES
- P/E / / CONS 84/11/30 R/H
107091 72 94 17
107D91 72 94 17
107091 72 94 17
73588 30CR 94 17
735BE 30CR 94 17
73588 30CR 94 17
536 00 94 17 504 75
536 OOCR 94 17 504 75CR
48 OOCR 94 17 45 20CR
48 00 94 17 45 20
934 50CR 94 17 680 02CR
934 50 94 17 880 02
121 15 94 17 114 09
794 B2 94 17 746 4B
334 28 94 17 314 79
690 29 94 17 650 05
138i 74 94 17 1301 18
1407 44 94 17 1325 39
1457 66 94 17 1372 66
224.61 94 17
1644 54 94 17 1548 66
461 94 94 17 435 01
276 19 94 17 261 97
83 57 94 17 78 70
1480 09 94 17 1393 80
221 10 94 17 206 21
158 96 94 17 149 69
164 45 94 17 154 86
164 45 94 17 154 86
"S» 138 17 94 17 130 11
145 77 94 17 137 27
* 230 97 94 17 217 50




































































































































































































Billing for Jan-June 1986
January 14, 1986 - February 24, 1986
0401 Salary $ 4,927.25
10.266.18 $ 15,193.43





52 $ 8,690 .78
0603 Communication $ 429 .00
0623 Equipment Rental $ 1 061
517
95
72 $ 1, 579 . 67
0625 Testing $ 265 . 04
0629 Utilities $ 133
221
95
74 $ 355 69
0636 Office Supplies $ 44 00
0644 Eng. Suppl $ 59 26
0697 Misc. $ 65 58
0733 $ 258 47
0401 Salary $ 502 19
0410 Individual Cost $ 287 .55
0623 Equipment Rental $ 165. 50
$ 27,896.16
mlc\150-004.87\biU.exh
